The Value of Cost Benefit
Analysis of Road Projects.  Quarterly Economic Commentary Special Article, April 1985 by Mansergh, Nicholas et al.
The Value of Cost Benefit 
Analysis of Road Projects 
Nicholas Mansergh 
Special Article 
in 
QUARTERLY 
ECONOMIC 
COMMENTARY 
April 1985 
T.J.BAKER 
S. SCOTT 
L. HAYES 
E. s··ru· ·· 
.. <········· 
THE VALUE OF COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ROAD PROJECTS 
Nicholas Mansergh* 
Introduction 
The Government announced in the National Plan, and is now 
implementing, a major increase in road expenditure. One reason why this has 
happened is because cost benefit studies have suggested that such an increase 
could be justified in economic terms. The argument that cost benefit studies 
in some sense "justify" additional road investment has been accepted rather 
uncritically in recent years, and in view of its practical consequences requires 
closer examination. In discussing this argument I shall refer to Sean D. Barrett 
and David Mooney's recent cost benefit analysis of the Naas bypass, as a good 
recent example of such studies. 
There are two basic grounds for concern at the use of cost benefit analysis 
to support increases in road expenditure now. First, the type of justification for 
road investment which cost benefit analysis is able to provide is a rather 
specialised one. The fact that a project shows a high rate of return on a cost 
benefit study does not mean that our debt problems are unlikely to be made 
more acute by carrying out the project, or that the effect on permanent 
employment will necessarily be favourable, or that many other forms of public 
expenditure might not perform as well or better on both counts. It is doubtful 
whether an expansion of road investment represents an appropriate use of the 
very limited funds which can be assembled for expanding publicly funded 
activities, and we are only going to find out whether it is or not if we can 
develop techniques which will indicate what the likely effects of particular types 
of public expenditure on employment and the public finances are going to be. 
Secondly, there are obvious dangers in major increases of expenditure in 
areas where the main policy issues are unresolved. Ireland has no coherent 
transport policy, and even if one considers roads policy in isolation from other 
transport questions, there are still important unresolved issues. In particular, 
no clear choice has been made between developing a high cost, high quality 
road system which will generate substantial additional traffic, and increase 
dependence on private transport, and a more limited and balanced policy of 
using road investment as one of a number of instruments to reduce acute traffic 
and environmental problems. While actual application of cost benefit analysis 
to alternative means of resolving existing traffic problems would tend to favour 
the latter, more modest approach, merely using the fact that some road projects 
have been found to have favourable rates of return when analysed to support 
a higher general level of road spending is likely to cause a shift in the opposite 
direction, towards a more ambitious policy. 
• The author is a Town Planner with Cork Corporation. The views expressed in the article are the personal· 
views of the author. 
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The remainder of my paper is divided into two sections, dealing with the two 
main issues outlined above. The first section thus seeks to define more closely 
the relation between the benefits identified in a cost benefit study and 
employment and the government finances, while the second deals with the 
effects of an increase in road expenditure, justified by reference to cost benefit 
methods, on roads and transport policy. 
I. THE BROADER ECONOMIC STATUS OF ROAD USER 
BENEFITS 
One surprising effect of Ireland's continued debt and unemployment· 
problem has been increased interest in cost benefit analysis. It is surprising 
because the benefits measured in cost benefit analysis are basically increases in 
consumer welfare, and the relationship between such increases and the 
consequences of the projects analysed for employment and public indebtedness 
is very tenuous. 
The point is of some pratical significance. The Government's economic plan 
Building on Reality, which provides for a 52 per cent increase in road investment 
over the plan period, quotes as a reason for this the view of the National 
Planning Board that "a much higher level of investment in road improvements 
than is at present being undertaken could be justified using public sector 
investment appraisal techniques" (Building on Reality, p.58). The National 
Planning Board see foreign borrowing as an appropriate way of funding this 
increase (Proposals for Plan, p.101). 
It is not easy to reconcile this view with the Board's statements that "public 
sector foreign borrowing should be undertaken only to finance investment 
which generates a return which covers the cost of this debt service" by a 
substantial margin,. (p.44) because if this is not done, "cumulative debt 
servicing problems will occur and the public debt will grow exponentially" 
(p.35). There is no evidence that the return on road investment to the 
Government generates anything like a sufficient return to cover 1the cost of debt 
service. Presumably their real view is that benefits to the community, not the 
Government, should exceed interest on the capital cost of the project, but this 
leaves us with a logical gap: unless benefits to the community can be converted 
into income for the Government, we have no assurance that such projects will 
not contribute to the exponential growth in public debt which the Board 
deplores. 
The gap could theoretically be closed by charging tolls and the Board favours 
this (p.101). However, it seems unlikely that toll roads will finance more than 
a small proportion of road spending, because: 
( 1) Most road schemes are not suitable for toll collection. 
(2) The yield on roads which are suitable for toll collection may be low, and 
require supplementing. For instance it was estimated that annual income 
from a toll on the Naas Bypass would be c. £750,0001, or around 4 per 
cent of capital cost (The Irish Times, 20.9.83). 
I This illustrates the wide gap between the financial return of road projects, based on toll revenues, as 
compared with the estimated cost benefit return (21 per cent in this case). The difference arises because 
it is never possible for a producer to charge each consumer the maximum he or she, individually, is prepared 
to pay and consumers are therefore always left in possession of substantial "consumers surplus". For this 
reason, cost benefit calculations typically show much higher rates of return than commercial assessments 
of the same project (Glassborow, 1960). 37 
(3) If there was going to be a major shift in roads policy towards toll roads, the 
proposed increase in public expenditure on roads appears unnecessary, as 
the Government envisages that the toll roads will be built by private 
enterprise. 
It is also possible to argue that road investment increases welfare more than 
it increases debt payments, and that it is theoretically possible to increase 
taxation (preferably of the upper income groups who put the highest value on 
time savings and will therefore presumably enjoy much of the benefits) while 
still leaving the community, as a whole, better off. However, most Government 
activities increase welfare, and whether the cost of the activities exceeds the 
benefits, or vice versa, recovering the benefits through taxation remains 
difficult. For practical purposes, both the tax authorities and the public will 
equate the tax base with cash income, and exclude benefits in kind from 
Government activities. 
There is thus an important practical distinction between benefits to road 
users and income for the Government. In the language of cost benefit analysis, 
there may be considerable difficulty in converting the potential Pareto 
improvement identified by a cost benefit study into an actual Pareto 
improvement, so that the gainers - the users of the roads - actually 
compensate the main loser, the Government. In the absence of a 
straightforward increase in taxation to pay for additional road expenditure the 
recovery of the funds invested ( other than through tolls and taxes arising from 
the construction work itself) depends on the benefits enjoyed by the community 
leading indirectly to increased employment, a widening of the tax base, and 
increased income for the Government. Unfortunately, the links between 
increased community benefits and increased employment and tax revenue are 
very unreliable. To illustrate this point, a discussion of the development and 
function of cost benefit analysis is necessary. 
The Development of Cost Benefit Ana?Jlsis 
Cost benefit analysis of road investments has developed because the 
conventional method of assessing an investment - by seeing whether the prices 
one is able to charge after the investment has been made provide an adequate 
return on the capital invested or not - is not applicable, as road users are not 
charged specifically for the use of new or improved sections of road. In the 
absence of tolls, one is left with the problem of assessing the value of benefits 
in kind - time savings, fuel savings, reductions in accidents and so on - for 
which no cash price has been paid. This difficulty was of practical as well as 
theoretical significance for those seeking to justify road investment, and in 
Britain after the Second World War, the first attempts were made (by the 
British Roads Federation) to put a monetary value on the benefits of road 
construction (Brunner, 1948; Brunner and Drake, 1952). These were followed 
in 1960 by the much more sophisticated M1 Study (Beesley and Reynolds, 
1960) which effectively established the technique in its modern form. 
Benefits in Kind 
However, the ability to value benefits in kind irrespective of whether a price 
has actually been paid for them or not is a source of weakness as well as 
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strength. Some of the benefits are going to be in the form of non-working time; 
a large number of people will have a few minutes more (non-motoring) leisure 
time at their disposal. The benefit to these people may be real, but because it 
is a direct benefit in kind it does not result in the further purchases and in the 
further creation of employment and tax revenues which would have arisen in 
the case of a cash payment. In other words, this particular type of benefit is 
irrelevant to employment and government income. 
In the Naas Bypass Study, as in most such studies, benefits in the form of 
non-working time are a minority of total benefits (around one-quarter in the 
Naas Study). Almost two-thirds of the benefits identified in the Naas Study are 
in the form of working time. However, even in relation to working time, the 
gap between the benefit in kind conferred and any further economic effect 
remains, though in a reduced form. Theoretically, working time savings will 
benefit the business concerned. The authors of the Naas Study cite two 
American studies carried out in the early 1960s showing that hauliers were able 
to "attain the full benefits from highway improvements by economising on fleet 
and labour costs", and note that in those parts of the labour force most likely 
to travel by road on business "monopolistic power is limited". 
A British study in the late 1970s suggested that small time savings are 
difficult to use, because peoples' days are usually organised into a number of 
activities, and substantial time savings may be necessary if an additional 
activity is to be fitted in (Heggie, 1979). As a result, cost benefit studies may 
grossly overstate the economic value of time savings to businesses. Small time 
savings may be particularly relevant in a country of short distances such as 
Ireland. It is difficult to accept that there is not significant "leakage", with a 
substantial proportion of working time savings making life easier for the driver 
but having no further economic significance. 
Employment and Financial Implications 
The working time savings which do result in labour savings to an employer 
will enable him to increase his profit margins and/or his sales. Increased 
employment arising from either of these causes may or may not be sufficient 
to offset the effects of reducing the labour content of each unit of production. 
The effect on the public finances is similarly unpredictable, as transfers of 
income from the highly taxed household sector to the lightly taxed cofporate 
sector would reduce tax revenues. Some of the potential for employment 
creation would only become actual after further public funding had been 
provided in the form of IDA grants. There is no reason to suppose that the net 
effect in terms of employment or for the Exchequer is necessarily going to be 
related to the value of the original benefits estimated in the cost benefit 
analysis, or that they are going to be positive at all. 
The Naas Bypass Study is a particularly good example of the drawbacks of 
cost benefit analysis because the proportion of benefits which are not in the 
form of time savings is unusually low (9% of total). In effect, the bypass is 
presented as a publicly funded labour saving project, which must be 
questionable in a period when there is every prospect of high unemployment 
continuing for an extended period. As there is no necessary relationship 
between the benefits identified by the Study, and the increase in employment 
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and Exchequer income arising from the project (if any), we are no wiser as to 
the effect of such projects on the main economic variables as a result of the 
analysis. However, given the likelihood of extensive "leakage" of benefits, only 
a limited proportion of the benefits identified in the analysis are going to have 
further economic effects. We do not know whether these effects are positive or 
negative, and if they are positive, what leverage the "effective" benefits exert 
on employment and income. In so far as there is an increase in income, the 
Government should be able to recover a limited proportion of it through 
taxation. For the Government to derive enough income in this way to offset 
interest payments on the capital invested, the "effective" benefits would have 
to exert a fairly remarkable degree of leverage on household income. 
This is not to say that road investment does not improve the prospects for 
foreign investment, but merely that it is not known whether the improvement 
is sufficient to offset any negative effects road investment may have on 
employment by a worthwhile margin. The cost effectiveness of road investment 
also needs to be questioned: by 1987, the capital allocation for roads will be over 
40 per cent of that for industry, and it is particularly difficult to believe that 
employment gains will be anything like in proportion. Nor is it clear what sort 
of road improvement is required to achieve such benefits, assuming they are 
available. Are we to aim for a road system as good as those foreign executives 
use at home, or at a system which provides them with a more modest, but more 
predictable service (NESC, 1981) or should we be satisfied if the road system 
does not become more of a constraint to industrial expansion than it is at 
present (ESRI, 1984)? Many of the road schemes actually being planned or 
built would make most sense in the context of the first objective, which is also 
the most ambitious and expensive, and for which the largest effect on 
employment would be needed by way of justification. 
Tendency to Overstate User Benefits 
Allowance should also be made for the tendency for cost benefit analysis to 
overstate user benefits in the first place, and the effect this may have on the 
recoverability of capital invested. For purely methodological reasons it is easier 
to value the direct effects of a project than indirect ones. The direct effects on 
users are normally exclusively beneficial, the indirect effects frequently adverse, 
and the consequence of being able to value the former but not the latter is to 
introduce a bias which will normally be in favour of the project considered. 
Like most similar studies, the Naas Bypass Study values construction and 
maintenance costs and user benefits only. It considers, but does not value, 
some environmental effects of the project, this being the issue with which 
British critics of cost benefit analysis are most concerned. Other indirect effects 
which are likely to have more direct relevance to the public finances are: 
(1) the effects on unit costs (Thompson, 1974) of the parallel Dublin Cork rail 
line, and indirectly on the CIE deficit, 
(2) the effect of additional traffic generated by provision of the motorway on 
traffic conditions in Dublin, offsetting user benefits on the road itself, 
(3) the likely stimulus to "one off' commuter housing around and to the west 
of Naas and its impact on servicing costs for local authorities and other 
statutory undertakers (Suffren, 1977). 
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To be fair, the generation of additional traffic is also likely to produce 
additional government revenue by increasing the consumption of motor 
products, though ·at the cost of raising imports, particularly imports of oil. 
Implications for Economic Policy 
Road investment is not a particularly suitable means of providing additional 
employment in present circumstances because the extent to which funds can 
be recovered by the Exchequer has not been established, and the effects on 
public debt are unknown and un.!2ontrolled. 
The current willingness to invest in roads may owe something to a reh1ctance 
to reduce capital expenditure too drastically because of the effects this might 
have on unemployment. If this is a major motive, it would be better if it were 
evaluated more explicitly; The difficulty with infrastructural investment as a 
means of combating unemployment is that if the bulk of the funds spent cannot 
be recovered, then they will have to be provided afresh each year merely to 
maintain the same level of employment. The same objection applies to the 
special employment schemes which have al.so developed rapidly in the ll:l.st few 
years. 
In present circumstances there are clear advantages in forms of public 
expenditure which generate income directly through sales or charges as well as 
indirectly through taxation, and this applies partic:i:!larly to the construction 
sector, where there is very high unemployment but where conventional public 
investment programmes on the scale required would be very difficult to finance 
( cf. ESRI, 1984 ). 
It is possible to devise forms of public expenditure where- the funds spent can 
be largely or wholly recovered, and can be seen to be recovered without 
necessarily being profitable in the conventional sense. In the commercial area, 
if a public sector organisation requires public support which is less than the net 
tax income generated through its expenditure and any savings in social welfare 
arising from its operation, then it is providing employment at no net cost to 
the Exchequer. It is merely not making a contribution to the Exchequer, which 
is acceptable providing the practice can be confined to specific areas of the 
economy where there is no serious prospect of profitability, such as public 
transport and rehabilitation of older housing. It should be possible to calculate 
the tax income generated by the expenditure of a commercial operation, using 
input-output techniques, and such calculations could be used as a means of 
controlling public funding of such projects. 
It is unfortunate that unwise investments in public enterprises have had the 
effect of reducing interest in public commercial activity, as a more rational 
result might be a reduction in the national enthusiasm for investment. 
Concentration on labour intensive commercial activities not involving 
significant investment, possibly organised at a local level, would~altow the 
effects of employment creating projects to be more closely controlled. I have 
suggested some possible activities elsewhere (Mansergh, 1984). Some of these 
activities like the rehabilitation of inner city buildings for resale would have 
some of the advantages of public investment programmes (tackling long-term 
problems, reducing a drain on resources), while at the same time opening up 
the possibility of funding over a number of years being used cumulatively in 
order to build up the numbers of employed. 
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II. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND TRANSPORT POLICY 
The Naas bypass is the Republic's first motorway and gives us access for the 
first time to the highest level of road quality and design speeds currently 
available. One effect of providing roads of this quality is that the volume of 
traffic will increase, relative to what ·it would have been if a more modest, lower 
speed road had been built, and also, of course, relative to the situation if no 
new road had been built. It has been estimated that the average motorway 
opens with one third more traffic than can be accounted for by diversion from 
other roads (Drake, 1969) and thereafter may gain traffic more than twice as 
fast as the conventional road system (Tanner, 1968)2. 
Approach to Generated Traffic 
One unfortunate feature of discussion of roads investment in Ireland to date 
is that is has tended to blur the distinction between two different forms of 
support for road improvements, based on different attitudes to this issue of 
traffic "generated" by the road improvement itself. On the one hand it can be 
argued that one should seek the highest reasonable level of quality, because 
time benefits in particular increase as speeds increase, and that the generation 
of additional traffic should be regarded either as a further benefit ( a convention 
exists by which benefits to such traffic are valued at one half the value of 
comparable non-generated traffic) or at any rate as a neutral side effect. On 
the other hand, one can argue that the primary function of road improvements 
is to eliminate existing congestion, accident and environmental problems, and 
that it is an error to do so through the provision of very high quality roads 
because this will create additional traffic which will spill over onto the road 
network adjoining the motorway and create new problems there, as well as 
make the process of eliminating existing problems unduly slow and expensive. 
I shall use the term "expansionist" to describe the first approach (because of 
the tendency toward mutually reinforcing expansion of traffic and the road 
system) and "equilibrium" to describe the second (because it seeks a better 
balance between road capacity and traffic volumes). 
Up till the late 1960s, most advanced countries followed an expansionist 
policy. Resistance to urban motorway proposals then produced a rather 
schizophrenic approach, as transport ministries adopted a more equilibrium 
oriented or "balanced" policy in relation to urban roads, but not inter-urban 
ones. This included a more favourable attitude to public transport, but 
progress in this direction has fallen off in recent years, partly because of 
political changes and partly because the financial support given for public 
transport costs and capital projects was not a substitute for the necessary 
structural changes in the transport market. The shift in favour of a more 
balanced approach was usually accompanied by changes in organisation, so as 
to bring responsibility for road construction and for other forms of transport 
together in one organisation (Starkie, 1976). The rather gradual moves towards 
2 As road use is affected by other factors apart from traffic generation, the extent to which this process is 
apparent will vary. Generation effects are likely to be least obvious in situations where economic 
circumstances are depressing the underlying rate of growth of traffic. Traffic generation will nevertheless 
take place, relative to what would otherwise have occurred, unless demand is completely inelastic and there 
is thus no response to reductions in the generalised cost of road use. 
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a Transportation Authority in Dublin are a belated and localised Irish version 
of this process. 
Tendency for COBA to Support High Cost Strategies in Practice 
In theory cost benefit analysis can be used to adjudicate between these two 
approaches, and would be expected to favour the equilibrium oriented 
approach in the majority of cases, because: 
( a) where the existing road system is acutely unsatisfactory and road 
improvements at modest cost are physically practicable, the savings in time 
and travel costs are likely to be large in relation to the cost of the 
improvement, giving a high rate of return. It is difficult to achieve an 
equivalent rate of return on the further expenditure necessary to provide 
a higher quality road improvement. Where the existing road system is only 
mildly unsatisfactory, this may not be so, but in these circumstances the 
returns from any levels of road imp:r:ovement will be less; 
(b) raising the quality of a road improvement can easily have a 
disproportionate effect on cost, because the task of designing a road which 
avoids expensive property or natural obstacles becomes much more difficult 
as one increases the minimum radius of the curves and the width of the 
corridor required. 3 
However, adjudicating between high and low cost approaches is only one of 
the uses which can be made of cost benefit analysis in the transport area. The 
other main use, as we have seen, is to provide a more general justification for 
increase in road expenditure, on the argument that representative schemes 
have been justified by cost benefit studies. In practice, this second application 
of cost benefit studies appears to have much more influence on events. 
In turn, an increase in road expenditure will create the conditions in 
which an expansionist strategy can be applied, the possible preferences of those 
who have carried out some of the studies for a more modest approach 
notwithstanding. The principal reason for this is that the point of the analysis 
is generally perceived as being to determine whether the project's rate of return 
exceeds some minimum test rate. Given the organisational and professional 
pressures to seek the most expensive scheme standing a reasonable chance of 
funding, the natural consequence of this would be for most schemes put 
forward to have rates of return only slightly above the test rate. The reason this 
does not happen at present is because most Irish road improvements are put 
forward without a supporting cost benefit study, but a more informal process, 
by which the most expensive scheme likely to be sanctioned is put forward, can 
readily be envisaged. The effect of asserting, with the National Planning Board 
and Building on Reality, that "a much higher level of investment in road 
improvement . . . . could be justified using public investment appraisal 
techniques" and increasing the allocation for roads as a result, will presumably 
be to extend this process. 
3 This view is consistent with the finding that the rate of return falls as the level of service is increased 
(Barrett, 1975/76). 
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Transport policy should take account of the particular circumstances of 
particular countries, including the presence or absence of a domestic motor 
industry and other macroeconomic. circumstances ( cf. Rothschild, 197 4 ). It is 
not helpful to compare our road investment rate with that of other countries 
without knowing how far those countries have benefitted from their 
investments, and if they have, how far the conditions which allowed them to do 
so exist in Ireland now. At the simplest level, an expansionist policy is more 
expensive, takes longer to eliminate current problems and is more likely to 
generate new ones. The countries which have pursued the expansionist course 
with most enthusiasm in the past have had large domestic automobile and 
related industries and have been very conscious of the effects transport policy 
decisions might have on them (Buchanan, 1958). They have also been 
influenced by macroeconomic considerations (Rose, 1979), which, as suggested 
earlier, are probably irrelevant to our own current problems. 
In particular, the growth in transport spending in the United States and 
Britain in the 1950s, which resulted in their respective freeway/motorway 
building programmes ·was largely motivated, at least as regards timing, by the 
need to increase civilian expenditure to offset the decline in military spending 
after the end of the Korean war. The most advanced countries have 
traditionally found it possible, and on some arguments, necessary, to embark 
on massive public expenditure projects, both civilian and military. Ambitious 
expenditures of this sort are normally an effect of the country's prosperity, and 
it is doubtful whether smaller and poorer countries are wise in seeking to 
imitate them. When the United States and Britain were beginning their 
motorway programme~ they were not faced by acute debt problems and, as 
imports of motor products into· those-.countries was low then, they could be 
confident that the boost to the transport related industries would be almost 
entirely domestic. The gradual development of a motorway programme in 
Ireland at present is reminiscent of what the British were doing in the late 1950s 
(the Preston bypass, followed by the first phase of the Ml) but without the 
favourable surrounding circumstances. 
We will not, however, know for some time whether the Naas bypass was, with 
hindsight, the first piece of an incremental motorway programme or not. As 
motorways are a potentially emotive issue, there are good reasons for not 
presenting it in that light. The motorway content of a roads programme is only 
a moderate guide to how expansionist it is. 
Despite the more favourable surrounding circumstances, public dis-
satisfaction with the results of expansionist policies - primarily for 
environmental reasons - has been a striking feature of transport planning in 
wealthier countries, and this has not been confined to urban road proposals. 
The advantages of being a late developer are unnecessarily limited if one does 
not take advantage of the opportunity to learn from the experience of others. 
An expansionist roads policy is also likely to make it more difficult and 
expensive to maintain any given level of public transport, because it usually 
diminishes the quality advantage of public transport or increases its quality 
disadvantages, and thus reduces demand, service frequencies and support for 
overhead costs such as track maintenance. This process is going to make life 
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more difficult for the 61 per cent of the Irish population over 10 who do not 
currently hold any driving licence. 4 (Hillman 197 3). 
Because of the absence of a domestic motor industry, Ireland has a stronger 
interest in an equilibrium oriented roads policy than most of her neighbours, 
and it is unfortunate -that she is pursuing this policy, and the corresponding 
transport policies, in a half hearted way even in urban areas, where the 
arguments fo; this approach are widely accepted. Ireland may also have an 
interest in applying a more equilibrium oriented approach to inter-urban 
roads, even though this approach is not generally followed internationally. 
If any such shift is to occur, politicians, administrators and economists are 
going to have to concern themselves as much with the type of road being built 
as with the absolute amount of money being spent. The quality of roads must 
thus become a'policy issue, and not simply an engineering one. In some cases 
this is going to require willingness to experiment. For instance, the standard 
design of motorways is a package with two main elements: segregation of motor 
traffic from opposing flows and from other road users, which results in fewer 
accidents and relatively constant speeds leading to fuel savings, and high design 
speeds, which save time but partly offset the accident and fuel savings achieved 
through segregation. An equilibrium oriented inter-urban road policy would 
be interested in developing a lower cost lower speed design which nevertheless 
retained a significant degree of traffic segregation. At present the necessary 
design work has not been done. because the countries and the professional 
groups who have had most influence on road design have not been very 
interested in equilibrium oriented policies for inter-urban roads. 
An equilibrium oriented roads policy would also set a much higher value on 
predictability in travel times, rather than on reducing average journey times as 
much as possible. In urban areas, the techniques to achieve this exist, and 
basically involve controlling the flow of traffic onto the sensitive parts of the 
road network: these techniques have not been applied much in Ireland. 
Conclusion 
The practical effect of cost benefit studies has been to give the impression 
that the economic and transpor~ benefits of current road investments are 
greater and m~re certain than they really are. The excessive trust placed in this 
technique.at present focuses attention on the relatively peripheral questions it is 
capable of answering, to the detriment of more vital issues. If we are to make 
judgements on the value of particular types of road investment at present, we 
will need to know more about its effects on specific issues of importance. To 
get specific answers, we· will need to ask specific questions. 
This is not to say that cost benefit analysis is not a useful way of exploring 
a number of issues of interest, providing these issues are clearly defined. It is 
reasonable to use cost benefit as a justification for road investment, providing 
that it is made clear that the justification is essentially in terms of consumer 
4 Mayer Hillman argued that older children and adults without driving licences will wish to be able to make 
trips without necessarily being accompanied by a car driver, and that the correct measure of access to the 
use of a car was not the proportion of households owning a car, but the the proportion of individuals capable 
of independent travel who are able to drive a car and have one available. DOE returns show total licences 
(including provisional licences) in 1984 were 1.11 million, as compared with an estimated population over 
10 of 2.86 million. 
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welfare, and that the broader economic effects of road investment are not fully 
understood. Policy makers, having been informed of the relationship between 
benefits to road users and the cost of providing these benefits, will be in a 
reasonable position to decide what priority they will give to the welfare of road 
users, relative to other calls on resources. They should, however, also have 
access to information on the other effects of road investment. 
Cost benefit analysis can also be of value as a means of comparing different 
solutions to the same traffic or environmental problem. If used in this way, its 
value will depend principally on the quality and range of alternatives 
considered, and how realistically these are costed. The range of alternatives can 
be improved if one uses a team based approach with different members of the 
team having different approaches or design philosophies, and if they are asked 
to provide additional schemes specifically to meet gaps in the cost range. 
The usefulness of estimates of benefits can be increased by carrying out 
sensitivity tests, and some of these were carried out in the Naas Study. 
Additional sensitivity tests which might cast light on the issue of traffic 
generation might include: 
(i) ignoring all time benefits arising from travel at speeds in excess of the 
official speed limit. 
(ii) ignoring all time benefits arising from travel in excess of, say, 45 mph on 
rural roads and 20 mph on urban roads. 
One could derive from test (ii) a crude measure of how far roads could be 
regarded as "expansionist". The greater the reduction in benefits resulting 
from the application of such tests, the more the value of the road lies in 
permitting relatively high speeds rather than eliminating low ones, and the 
more it is reasonable to characterise it as "expansionist". Such tests will affect 
the rankings of the alternatives, and may help illustrate the point that an 
apparently fairly basic inter-urban road can be just as expansionist as a 
motorway. 
A more modest, equilibrium based policy may mean that some schemes, 
which make sense primarily on expansionist assumptions, are not necessary, 
and that other schemes can be carried out more economically. This may permit 
more rapid resolution of outstanding problems. Alternatively some of the funds 
available could be used for non-transport purposes, or to fund low cost 
experimental transport works and services, such as community car pools, · 
(Fishman and Wabe, 1969), local collective taxi services in areas not served by 
bus, cycleways and bus priorities. The first two could be developed as self 
funding employment projects in the sense described earlier. The real case for 
road building at present is that some solution to the more acute existing and 
prospective traffic and traffic related problems will have to be found at some 
time and that as the opportunity cost of labour is very low at present there is 
something to be said for doing it now. But this argument applies equally to 
measures which tend to diminish demand for road capacity as well as to road 
construction, and does not apply to road schemes which generate substantial 
additional traffic and approach the problems involved in an unnecessarily 
expensive manner. 
46 
References 
BARRETT, S.D., 1975/76. "The Economic Evaluation of Road Investment in the Republic of Ireland", 
Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. XXIII Pt. III p.1. · 
BARRETT, S.D. and D. MOONEY, 1984. "The Naas Motorway Bypass. - A Cost Benefit Analysis" 
Quarterry Economic Commentary, January, p.21. 
BEESLEY, M.E. and D.J. REYNOLDS, 1960. "The London Birmingham Motorway" /wad Research 
Technical Report No. 46, Road Research Laboratory. 
BRUNNER, C.T., 1948. The Road W,ry to Recovery British Road Federation. 
BRUNNER, C.T. and]. DRAKE, 1952. "The Place of a Modern Road System in the National Economy", 
Journal of the Town Planning Institute, Vol. XXXVIII No. 7 May. 
BUCHANAN, C.D., 1958. Mixed Blessing, London: Leonard Hill Ltd. 
DRAKE, J., 1969. Motorways, London: Faber and Faber, p.76. 
THE ECONOMIC AND .SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 1984. Emplqyment and Unemplqyment Policy 
for Ireland, D. Conniffe and K.A. Kennedy (eds.), Dublin: Chs. 8, 12, 18. 
GLASSBOROW D.W. 1960. "The Road Research Laboratory Investment Criteria Examined" Bulletin of the 
Oxford Institute of Statistics, Vol. 22 No. 4, Nov. 
HEGGIE, I.G. 1979. "Economics and the Road Programme", journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. 
Xlll No .. 1, January, p.52. 
FISHMAN, L. and J.S. WABE 1969. "Restructuring the Form of Car Ownership", Transportation Research, 
Vol. 3, No. 4 Dec. p.429. 
HILLMAN, M. with I. HENDERSON and A. WHALLEY 1973. "Personal Mobility and Transport 
Policy", Political and Economic Planning Broadsheet 542, June. · 
MANSERGH, N.B.K. 1984. "Physical Planning and Employment" Proceedings of National Planning 
Conference, 
(Cork), Irish Planning Institute, May. 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL 1981. The Importance of Infrastructure to Industrial 
Development in Ireland, Dublin: July, Ch. 4. 
NATIONAL PLANNING BOARD 1984. Proposals for Plan, Pl. 2309 Dublin: Stationery Office 
ROSE, M.H. 1979. Interstate: &press Highway Poiitics, 191:1-56, University Press of Kansas. 
ROTHSCHILD, E. 1974. Paradise Lost: The Decline of the Auto Industrial Age, New York: Vintage Books, 
Chapter 8. 
STARKIE, D.N.M. 1976. Transportation Planning Policy and Anarysis, Oxford: Pergamon Press, p.94. 
STATIONERY OFFICE, 1984. Building on Reality, Pl.2648, Dublin: Stationery Office. 
SUFFREN, P. 1977. Housing in Rural Ireland, Dublin: An Foras Forbartha, Section 5. 
TANNER, J.C. 1968. An Economic Comparison of Motorways with two and three lanes in Each Direction, Road 
Research Laboratory, LR205 HMSO, p.24. 
THOMSON J.M. 1974. Modem Transport Economics, Middlesex: Penguin Hammondsworth, p.93. 
47 

